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Abstract
In theory, access control is a solved problem. In prac-
tice, large real-world enterprises still report trouble:
de facto policy becomes unmanageable; users circum-
vent controls. These issues can be particularly criti-
cal in medical IT, such as emerging EMR and EHR,
where access control errors can have serious repercus-
sions. In this paper, we investigate how real-world
EMR users think about access control when they are
making policy decisions in the abstract–and when
they are actually using the system in treatment sce-
narios. Mismatches suggest places (“empathy gaps”)
where new policy tools may be needed.
1 Introduction
The Electronic Medical Record (EMR) is an effort
aimed at the comprehensive digital integration of
medical information formerly spread across a vari-
ety of traditional paper-based systems held by an en-
terprise in the healthcare industry; the related Elec-
tronic Health Records (EHR) reaches across enter-
prises [5]. More and more industries are replacing
their old fashioned systems with an integrated com-
puterized system to manage business data, perform
business operations and offer services to customers.
Healthcare is no exception.
An integrated electronic integrated system would
clearly offer advantages to both the care providers
and the patients receiving the services: for example,
in cost savings, efficiency, automatic alerts and re-
minders, and reduced error from illegible handwriting
(e.g.,[7]).
However, the shift to EMR and EHR does pose many
problems. For now, let’s consider the smaller chal-
lenge of EMR. As should come as no surprise to the
reader, an area of particular concern for an EMR is
the huge challenge to satisfy its users regarding pri-
vacy, confidentiality, and security. Providing med-
ical records with high availability, yet maintaining
their protection from unauthorized access is a com-
plex yet crucial task. Problems here risk endangering
the health condition and even risking lives of the pa-
tients (not to mention exposing the enterprise and
clinicians to regulatory and legal punishments).
Access Control Hygiene In computer security,
access control addresses the problem of who can do
what in an information system. In the initial view, we
imagine an access control policy as a matrix consisting
of the subjects (actors) versus the objects (resources);
the entries in a particular subject-object cell specify
the current things that subject is allowed to do with
that object. Research and practice has given rise to
more elaborate models and tools, such as role-based
access control (e.g, [12]) and experience-based access
management (e.g., [6]). (Some researchers even for-
malize notions of optimistic security: assuming that
subjects are allowed access, and trying to discover
and straighten out problems afterwards [9].)
In theory, an enterprise sets the right access con-
trol policy that permits all the necessary access and
blocks all the bad ones, and installs the right IT to
monitor and enforce this policy. Unfortunately, it is
often reported that in large enterprises, the policy
followed in practice quickly devolves into an unman-
ageable spaghetti of shared passwords, post-it notes,
and other circumvention. One researcher termed this
the access control hygiene problem [2].
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As literature reports (e.g., [8]) and as we have seen
in our own fieldwork (e.g., [13, 14]), healthcare is no
exception. Indeed, the overwhelming urgency to take
care of the sick can lead to an environment where
availability of information dominates all other secu-
rity concerns. (We even had one clinician ask if we
wanted to “help patients” or merely “build a bet-
ter policeman.”) We have even seen medical enter-
prises dispense with access control policy altogether,
defaulting to “always allow” and hoping audit catches
abusers.
Crafting access control policy for computer-mediated
data systems such as EMRs has always been a crucial
task and a difficult problem. An overly “loose” pol-
icy might permit inappropriate access, but an overly
“tight” policy might prevent appropriate access and
encourage user circumvention, which may lead to
equally serious consequences. The policies are espe-
cially crucial since the healthcare field poses a num-
ber of difficulties and challenges not faced in other
security environments. For a start, the information
being protected is highly personal and maybe even
lethal—security breeches may lead to irrevocable con-
sequences for the individuals involved and might put
the individuals physical health or even life at serious
risk. Yet, at the same time, there is a need in emer-
gencies to access all the information relevant to the
conditions of a patient in order to provide a more ac-
curate evaluation of a patient’s health condition and
provider better treatment.
This situation lead to two fundamental problems.
• First, why does it seem so hard, in practice, to
create the right access control policy for large
enterprise EMRs?
• More subtly, how can we measure the amount
of circumvention that takes place in real-world
EMR? Each such act risks punishment for the
actor and the enterprise, making direct study
infeasible; however, science needs data, not just
anecdotes.
In this paper, we explore a novel direction to try
to shed light on these problems. Section 2 reviews
related work. Section 3 presents the approach we
take. Section 4 presents our experimental methods.
Section 5 presents our overall results, and Section 6
presents some analysis for demographic subgroups.
Section 7 discusses implications for EMR access con-
trol security, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Work
As mentioned earlier, Koppel et al [8] cataloged a
large number of ways clinicians worked around a
computer-based prescription system, in ordered to
get their jobs done.
The emergence of computerized medical records gives
rise to physician workarounds, which not only de-
feats the purpose of a computerized system of med-
ical records but also introduces a negative impact
on work practices. In their study [11], Saleem et
al found that clinicians created their own tools and
shadow processes to support their work when they
believed that the computer system caused them in-
convenience. The most common practice was for the
doctors and nurses to write down their findings on a
piece of paper and transfer to other physicians, which
carried the risk that medical orders would not be en-
tered into the electronic health record, potentially
creating gaps in documentation or even unintended
leaks of critical patients’ medical information. An-
other common workaround was the creation of elec-
tronic spreadsheets, on a local or personal machine,
because the medical professionals found this to be a
more convenient and flexible way to deal with their
data.
Ferreira et al reviewed [4] a decade of published lit-
erature on access control policies in the healthcare
industry. Of almost three dozen papers, these au-
thors only four systems where end users (as opposed
to enterprises or larger entities) could set policy—but
none of these were in fact implemented. Furthermore,
in none of the described systems described policies
whose creators included end-users. The authors con-
clude this lack of involvement of the EMR end-users
is a fundamental obstacle to effective use.
A better understanding of how the access control sys-
tems are designed and implemented can thus lend
insights on why such practices occur and how the
barriers can be overcome to produce a successful in-
tegration of EMR system in the healthcare industry.
As Ferreira et al note, such an understanding might
best start with the users.
Moving away from policy technology itself, in ear-
lier work [15] in our own lab, we examined how
end users in social networks interacted with policy
technology—and showed how an earlier psychological
result that “introspection inhibits intuition” applies.
Making such users think about setting policies leads
to counter-intuitively open policies.
2
3 Our Approach
To approach the access control hygiene problem in
medical IT, we thus decided to look at how real
medical users think about access control decisions in
EMRs. Anecdotally, the medical community creates
policies that medical users seem to often find too con-
straining, requiring workarounds.
Suppose we eliminate the gap that worried Ferreira
and assume the end-user population is also the popu-
lation setting the policy. Is there something different
about how humans make judgments in these two dif-
ferent settings?
The psychology literature offers experimental results
regarding this empathy gap (e.g., [3]). Humans can
indeed make quantitatively different decisions when
they are directly embedded in a situation versus when
they are reasoning about it abstractly (e.g, [1]); even
making decisions for one’s self in the future can be like
reasoning about others in the abstract (e.g., [10]).
We thus prepared an experiment to see if this em-
pathy gap plays a role in the access control hygiene
problem. In collaboration with medical colleagues,
we developed a corpus of EMR access control ques-
tions, each consisting of a scenario and a decision to
be made. For each question, we prepared two ver-
sions:
• a control version, phrased in an abstract, role-
based way (per the teachings of HIPAA on EMR
access control best practices), and
• an experimental version, putting the subject in a
hypothetical instantiation of that scenario.
(See the Appendix.)
We recruited real-world EMR users, divided them
into a control group and experimental group, and
gave each group the corresponding questions. If we
find significantly different answers, that would sug-
gest that reasonable real-world EMR users might
make policies that reasonable real-world EMR users
might be motivated to subvert—hence identifying
trouble spots for access control hygiene.
4 Methods
The subjects who participated in this study consisted
of 164 participants—78 in the experimental treat-
ment group and 86 in the control group. As noted
above, the experimental group received a treatment
effect that induces subjective experience on the user
comparing to the control group. The subjects were
composed of staff members a partner tertiary care re-
search and teaching hospital. The subjects included
clinicians at different stages of their professions (doc-
tors, nurses, residents, and medical students), as well
as non-clinicians (IT staff, administrators, billing spe-
cialists, etc.).
Subjects were recruited by an email from the medical
informatics group asking for volunteers to participate
in a study that examines perspectives relative to ac-
cess to and the privacy of medical records electroni-
cally. Subjects first responded to the email to show
interest in participating in the 15-minute study. The
names of interested participants were then collected
and randomly assigned into either the subjective ex-
periment group or the control group—we would thus
expect that demographic attributes of the partici-
pants in the two groups will be roughly equivalent and
therefore any effect observed between two groups can
be linked to the treatment effect—and is not likely a
result of the different characteristic of the individuals
in the group. Another email with the link to the sur-
vey was then sent out to each participant. This study
was approved by the Committee for the Protection of
Human Subjects, the Institutional Review Board at
Dartmouth College.
Surveys taken by both groups were composed on
surveymonkey.com and the participants were given
links to those surveys. We designed a simulated
healthcare record system that deals with patient in-
formation access and control issues that are common
in daily hospital settings and which may touch on
information access de facto best practices not neces-
sarily incorporated in current systems. Members of
each group completed a questionnaire that presented
them with scenarios in our simulated EHR and asked
them to make access control decisions for the new
system. (Subjects were instructed that the scenarios
were hypothetical; in particular, this was not a test
of how well they followed enterprise rules.)
The subjects were asked whether a certain action
should or should not be allowed under a particu-
lar circumstance. As noted above, we designed the
experiment so that the two groups were given the
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Figure 1: Overall, the populations differed signifi-
cantly. (The graphs show histograms of Likert an-
swers.)
same situation and the same actions except that in
the group with the treatment effect, we introduced a
more subjective experience of the scenario in question
on the person who is making access control decisions.
We phrased the questions so as to collect answers on
a Likert scale, from 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to a
more restrictive policy and 5 to a more open one.
For analysis, we thus ended up with pairs of sample
sets of Likert ratings. We used an F test to determine
whether the variances were equal; on the basis of that,
we used a t-test to see if the data warranted ruling out
the null hypothesis that any difference in the samples
was due to random noise.
5 Results
Figure 1 through Figure 3 show our overall results.
A priori, one might have predicted that the experi-
mental group (testing what it’s like to use an EMR)
would be make more permissive decisions than the
control group (testing what it’s like to create a pol-
icy), but wonder whether the difference would be sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.05). Figure 1 shows that
overall, both outcomes held.
However, looking at the data by individual question
reveals some surprises. (To simplify presentation in
this report, we sorted the questions by decreasing sig-
nificance of difference.) First, the populations dif-
fered significantly in only nine of the thirteen ques-
tions (Figure 2). In four of the thirteen, there was no
difference (Figure 3) Why? Why don’t these scenar-
ios reveal the empathy gap?
Furthermore, among the nine questions where the
subjects appeared to exhibit an empathy gap, the
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Figure 2: On nine questions, the populations differed
significantly. Note, however, that on Q6 and Q8, the
experimental group became more conservative! (The
graphs show histograms of Likert answers.)
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Figure 3: On four questions, the populations did not
differ significantly. (The graphs show histograms of
Likert answers.)
experimental group made looser access control deci-
sions (that is, indicating they might feel justified in
circumventing controls) in only seven. In the other
two scenarios (Q6 and Q8), the experimental group
made tighter access control decisions. What’s going
on here? (It’s as if frustrated end-users want to cir-
cumvent the system in order to add more controls!)
6 Demographic Groups
Our partner medical enterprise provided us a large
set of test subjects distributed throughout the staff.
As part of the survey, we gathered basic demographic
information, allowing us to partition the subjects into
various demographic groups among this population.
As a consequence, we decided to also look at differ-
ences in access control judgments based on these de-
mographics.
We partitioned the populations four different ways:
• by years of service (less than 10, 10-20, or over
20);
• by role at the hospital (physician, nurse, or ad-
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Figure 4: Histograms of answers when we partition
subjects by years of experience.
min/tech);
• by age (less than 40, 40-50, or over 50); and
• by gender (male, female).
For each partition, we examined how each sub-
group compared to its overall group—e.g., “nurses
in the control group” versus “everyone in the control
group”—over all the questions. We also compared
how each subgroup compared to its corresponding
subgroup in the other test—e.g., “nurse in the control
group” versus “nurses in the experimental group”.
However, this latter set of comparisons showed every
pair with statistically significant differences—which
is not very interesting.
For this paper, we did not yet do a finer-grained anal-
ysis looking at subsets of the questions.
Figure 4 shows the results when we partition by years
of service. Although we saw no statistically signifi-
cant differences, we do see a slight skewing to the ex-
tremes when we move to the most experienced users.
Whether setting policy or complaining about it, they
seem to be more sure of themselves.
Figure 5 shows the results when we partition by role
in the hospital. Here, we see that, in the control
group, the admin/tech staff made significantly dif-
ferent decisions from whoever wasn’t in that role—
visually, we can see the distribution is flatter. (Per-
haps the medical training the other roles receive
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Figure 5: Histograms of answers when we parti-
tion subjects by roles. The grayed-out boxes indi-
cate interesting differences: within the control group,
admin/tech subjects differed significantly from non-
admin/tech (p = 0.018)); physicians also differed
from non-physicians (p = 0.049).
makes them more confident?) Similarly, the con-
trol physicians differed from non-physicians, but with
a more non-flat distribution—supporting the train-
ing/confidence link.
Interestingly, these differences vanish when the sub-
jects are asked to make the same decisions subjec-
tively.
Figure 6 shows the results when we partition by
age. Here, we see that the middle-aged experimental
group makes significantly different decisions—-they
seem more sure of themselves, and more permissive,
then the experimental groups at other ages. The
younger experimental group differs significantly the
other way: they seem less sure of themselves.
Interestingly, these differences did not show up when
we asked subjects to make the same decisions, but in
a more abstract way.
Figure 7 shows the results when we partition by gen-
der. Here, we see that, within each group. the gen-
ders make significantly different decisions. In both
cases males seem less sure of themselves than females.
However, males also have more “5” answers, suggest-
ing they are more permissive; it is interesting to note
that Trudeau et al [15] found something similar in
social networks.
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Figure 6: Histograms of answers when we partition
subjects by age. The grayed-out boxes indicate in-
teresting differences: within the experimental group,
under-40 differed from the rest (p = 0.025); 40-50
also differed from the rest (p = 0.012).
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Figure 7: Histograms of answers when we partition
subjects by gender. In both the control and experi-
mental groups, the genders differed from each other
significantly (p = 0.001).
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7 Implications
In seven of the thirteen scenarios, reasonable EMR
users would make access control policy decisions that
reasonable EMR users would find overly constraining.
What this implies for EMR access control depends
on what stakeholders feel is the “correct” access con-
trol decision in these scenarios. If the more conser-
vative decision is desirable, then health enterprises
might wish to apply more education and stronger con-
trols and auditing in these settings, since the results
suggest that end-users will be frustrated here, and
may be tempted to circumvent the system. If stake-
holders are ambivalent about the “correct” decision,
then health enterprises may wish to switch towards a
“break-glass”/auditing model in these settings; frus-
trated end users can then take the actions they feel
necessary—but will need to justify their actions later.
On the hand, if stakeholders feel that the control
group decisions were systematically too restrictive in
these scenarios, then the results suggest that per-
haps researchers need to explore different ways of set-
ting policies. Rather than thinking in abstract terms
(“should a physician in setting X be allowed to Y?”),
thinking in terms of specific subjective experiences
(“should I be allowed to do this right now?”) would
enable policy-makers to make more accurate policies.
(Perhaps we need to begin experimenting with al-
ternative policy-creation tools—”audit to allow” for
humans.)
Although it’s tempting to suggest “involve more end-
users in policy creation,” we note that this result may
imply this suggestion is not sufficient—in our test, the
policy makers were end-users, so something more is
needed.
In four of the thirteen scenarios, reasonable EMR
users would make access control policy decisions that
reasonable EMR users would find just fine in practice.
If an enterprise is currently shying away from enforc-
ing access control, for fear of pushback by frustrated
users, these results imply that deploying tighter con-
trols in these settings will be acceptable.
In two of the thirteen scenarios, reasonable EMR
users would make access control policy decisions that
were looser than what reasonable users would want
in practice. The implications here require further
thought.
The above discussion suggests an overarching chal-
lenge: what is it that led to the usage scenarios
falling into these different classes? What procedure
can stakeholders use in general to tell which class a
given new scenario falls into? Although further anal-
ysis is required here, we offer some tentative observa-
tions:
• In the backwards cases (Q6 and Q8), where the
experimental group made tighter decisions, both
involved non-medical staff getting access.
Perhaps the work of the subjects in these two
scenarios are perceived as less relevant to patient
care.
• Two of the no-difference cases (Q11 and Q12) in-
volved a clinician of “lower” status than a physi-
cian getting access; the others involved a physi-
cian, but with some extra separation from direct
internal clinical care.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed (with real-world med-
ical practitioners) a set of representative EMR us-
age scenarios involving access control decisions. For
each scenario, we produced two versions: an abstract
version (such as one might encounter in crafting an
RBAC policy) and a specific, subjective version (such
as one might encounter in real treatment settings).
We then recruited a large set of real-world EMR users
from a partner hospital, partitioned them into two
groups, and gave each group one version of the sce-
narios. The resulting analysis showed that in many
cases, the subjective group made significantly looser
decisions. In these settings, it would appear that ef-
fective a priori policy construction is hampered by
an “empathy gap.” Identifying these scenarios and
reducing the gap might help improve usability and
security of medical IT.
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Appendix: Access Control Sce-
narios
In our control group, we asked standard, non-
subjective access control questions, as if the subject
was making an RBAC policy decision for the EMR.
In the experimental group, we asked about the ex-
act same scenarios, only in a personal and subjective
way—as if the subject using the EMR.
To aid in clarity of presentation, we enumerated the
questions in this report by significance of difference.
In this Appendix, we further subdivide into the three
groups of interest
In this first group of questions, the subject decisions
differed significantly (p < 0.05), with the experimen-
tal group making looser decisions:
C1: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives local addiction treatment programs full
access to a patient’s medical record if the patient is
diagnosed with serious alcohol abuse.
E1: Patient Condition: Erica Brown is a patient
diagnosed with serious alcohol abuse and was sent
to the local addiction treatment program. Your
Position/Relationship with the Patient: You are a
physician who works at the local addiction treatment
program. Erica was sent to you from the hospital.
You would like to provide some treatment for Erica.
Statement: It is appropriate that you gain access
to all paper and electronic records of Erica’s full
medical history at the hospital.
C2: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives local addiction treatment programs full
access to a patient’s medical record if the patient is
diagnosed with serious drug abuse.
E2: Patient Condition: Thomas Wagner is a
patient diagnosed with drug abuse and was sent
to the local addiction treatment program. Your
Position/Relationship with the Patient: You are a
physician who works at the local addiction treat-
ment program. Thomas was sent to you and you
would like to provide some treatment for Thomas.
Statement: It is appropriate that you gain access
to all paper and electronic records of Thomas’ full
medical history at the hospital.
C3: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives an attorney full access to a patient’s
medical record if he needs the patients information
to perform essential legal operations.
E3: Patient Condition: Melissa Kenning is a patient
who recently came to the hospital for consistent
hypertension and is now suing the hospital for
negligence. Your Position/Relationship with the
Patient: You are an attorney who specializes in legal
issues in medical practice. You have worked five
years as a member of the legal staff at the hospital.
You are assigned by the hospital to work on the
lawsuit with Melissa. Statement: It is appropriate
that you are able to see all paper and electronic
records of Melissa’s full medical history.
C4: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives local psychiatric hospitals or community
mental health services full access to a patient’s
medical record if the patient is diagnosed with
mental health problems.
E4: Patient Condition: Jake White is a patient
diagnosed with serious mental health problems
and was sent to the local psychiatric institution.
Your Position/Relationship with the Patient: You
are a physician who works at the local psychiatric
institution. Jake was sent to you and you would like
to provide some treatment for him. Statement: It
is appropriate that you gain access to all paper and
electronic records of Jake’s full medical history at
the hospital.
C5: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives emergency shelters or support groups
full access to a patient’s medical record if the patient
is an adult and is found to be a victim of serious
physical abuse.
E5: Patient Condition: Allison Weill was found to be
a victim of serious physical abuse and was sent to the
local emergency shelter. Your Position/Relationship
with the Patient: You are a physician who works
for the emergency shelter for women and children in
the local community. Allison was sent to you and
you would like to offer some help and provide some
resources for her. Statement: It is appropriate that
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you gain access to all paper and electronic records of
Allison’s full medical history at the hospital.
C7: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives a consulting physician full access to a
patient’s medical record when he has taken part in
the patient’s care.
E7: Patient Condition: Alex Miller is a patient
that came to the hospital yesterday for diarrhea.
Your Position/Relationship with the Patient: You
completed your residency in Gastroenterology and
have been practicing medicine for a few years. You
are the consulting physician for Alex. You have
closely examined his condition. Now you are about
to make a professional diagnosis and prognosis
regarding Alex’s disease and offer a treatment plan
to the attending physician and nurse practitioner.
Statement: It is appropriate that you gain access to
all paper and electronic records of Alex’s full medical
history.
C9: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy policy
gives a specialty physician full access to a patient’s
medical record when he is temporarily responsible for
the patient and carrying out a specialty treatment.
E9: Patient Condition: Adam Turner came into
the hospital yesterday. After he was diagnosed with
bronchitis, he was transferred for specialty treat-
ment. Your Position/Relationship with the Patient:
You have completed your residency in Pulmonary
Medicine, and have been practicing medicine for a
few years. You will be providing specialty treatment
for Adam. Statement: It is appropriate that you
gain access to all paper and electronic records of
Adam’s full medical history.
In this second group of questions, the subject deci-
sions differed significantly (p < 0.05), with the exper-
imental group making tighter decisions:
C6: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives a clerical worker full access to a patient’s
medical record if he needs the patients information
for administrative purposes.
E6: Patient Condition: Nina Martin is a patient
who came to the Hospital for food poisoning. Your
Position/Relationship with the Patient: You are a
clerical worker who works at the hospital. It would
be beneficial for you to gain access to Nina’s medical
history for administrative purposes. Statement: It
is appropriate that you gain access to all paper and
electronic records of Nina’s full medical history.
C8: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy policy
gives a government official full access to a patient’s
medical record if he needs the patients information
to carry out a public health operation.
E8: Patient Condition: Kristen Rogers is a patient
who came in to the hospital for a heart attack. Your
Position/Relationship with the Patient: You are a
government official who works for the Department of
Public Health. To improve public health conditions
and reduce healthcare costs, you took on the task
of performing a quality assessment on the quality
of care offered by hospitals. You are directed to
Kristen’s information by her primary physician.
Statement: It is appropriate that you gain access to
all of Kristen’s paper and electronic records of her
full medical history.
In the third group of questions, the subject decisions
did not differ significantly (p ≥ 0.05):
C10: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
policy gives a senior medical professor full access
to a patient’s sensitive medical records such as the
psychiatric record if the professor is giving clinical
education on this topic and needs the patients
information as part of his lecture.
E10: Patient Condition: Paul Smith was diagnosed
with anxiety disorders at the hospital. Your Posi-
tion/Relationship with the Patient: You are a senior
medical professor, and you will be giving a clinical
lesson on anxiety disorders. You are directed to
Paul’s information by his primary physician. Paul
displays many symptoms that closely match the
content of your lesson. Statement: It is appropriate
that you keep Paul anonymous and display all paper
and electronic records of his psychiatric history in
your presentation.
C11: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy
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policy gives a Registered Nurse Practitioner full
access to a patient’s medical record when he has
taken part in the patient’s care.
E11: Patient Condition: Darrick Johnson was sent
to the hospital for peripheral arterial disease. Your
Position/Relationship with the Patient: You are a
registered nurse practitioner and have worked in the
hospital for over five years. You are the primary
nurse responsible for Darrick’s care during his stay.
Statement: It is appropriate that you gain access
to all paper and electronic records of Darrick’s full
medical history.
C12: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy pol-
icy gives a resident full access to a patient’s medical
record when he has taken part in the patient’s care.
E12: Patient Condition: Andy Jacobs is a patient
that came into the hospital for recurring hives.
Your Position/Relationship with the Patient: As
a second-year resident specialized in Dermatology,
you are now in charge of Andy’s care along with a
physician assistant and a couple of medical students,
but you are not Andy’s attending doctor. Statement:
It is appropriate that you gain access to all paper
and electronic records of Andy’s full medical history.
C13: It is appropriate that the hospital privacy pol-
icy gives a physician full access to a patient’s medical
record from another hospital when he is providing
treatment to the patient during an emergency.
E13: Patient Condition: Melissa Gardner was just
in a traffic accident and was sent to the hospital.
Your Position/Relationship with the Patient: You
have completed your residency in Cardiology and
have been practicing medicine for a few years. As
the physician on-call tonight, you will be providing
emergency treatment to Melissa. Statement: It is
appropriate that you gain access to all paper and
electronic records of Melissa’s full medical history
kept at another hospital.
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